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Abstract 
 
The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional 
representation and coalition governments at the micro-level. The study focuses in particular 
on the question whether participation in repeated elections allows voters to learn from 
experience and enables them to optimize their decision behavior. An economic group 
experiment with decision scenarios of varying degrees of difficulty was used to test decision 
making at both the individual and group level. The results suggest that a majority of voters 
were able to pursue successful decision strategies and that the difficulty of the decision 
scenarios affected the voting performance of the participants as expected. However, a learning 
effect is not supported by the data. 
 
 
Authors’ note: We thank Sarah Widmaier, Georg Richarz, and Nora Schütze for skillful 
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Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems: A Group Experiment 
 
The theory and experimental research on strategic voting, defined as casting a vote for 
a party other than the most preferred party in order to best influence the election outcome (see 
Cox 1997, Fisher 2004), has focused predominantly on the classic case, single member 
districts with three candidates. Multiparty systems with proportional representation and 
coalition governments are usually considered to offer insufficient incentives for strategic 
voting. Because most elections in parliamentary democracies produce legislatures with more 
than three parties, coalition governments are a typical outcome. 
There is compelling evidence, however, that strategic voting is far from unknown in 
these political systems. Aggregate-level voting patterns as well as individual-level survey 
research suggest that a non-trivial share of voters engage in strategic voting, given the 
appropriate circumstances (e.g., Abramson et al. 1992, Alvarez and Nagler 2000, Alvarez, 
Boehmke, and Nagler 2006, Blais et al. 2001, Fisher 2004, Gschwend 2007, Hermann and 
Pappi 2008, Lanoue and Bowler 1992, Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin 1992).  
Strategic voting in multiparty systems is complex because its goal is not (just) to 
produce a single “winner” in a single member district. In fact, different mechanisms can have 
quite different effects on government formation. Strategic voting can influence (1) which 
party passes, or fails to pass, a minimum vote threshold for representation, (2) which parties 
are able (or strong enough) to form coalitions, and (3) the relative weight of parties within 
coalitions. As a consequence, a vote for any party or even abstention might represent the 
optimal decision in a given electoral context (Meffert and Gschwend 2007).  
Given the complexity of this decision task combined with well-known doubts about 
the political sophistication of the electorate (Zaller 1992), it might appear unlikely that the 
average voter would be able to engage in successful strategic voting. In addition, even if it is 
possible in survey-based research to identify voters that cast a ballot for a party other than the 
most preferred party, it is nearly impossible to confirm a decision process as postulated by the 
theory of strategic voting. This leaves experimental studies as the method of choice to test the 
logic of strategic voting at the micro-level. So far (as far as we know), only three economic 
strategic voting experiments have explicitly addressed the aspect of coalition governments in 
multiparty systems (Goodin, Güth, & Sausgruber 2008; McCuen & Morton 2002; Meffert & 
Gschwend 2007). Goodin, Güth, and Sausgruber (2008) find mixed support for strategic 
voting, but their decision to assign to participants (or mix) both voter and party (leader) roles 
makes this study not a good test. McCuen and Morton (2002), on the other hand, find support 
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for their tactical coalition voting (TCV) model. The choice set in this study included only 
three parties and thus just barely models a multiparty system, rendering the coalition 
formation aspect rather trivial. Finally, Meffert and Gschwend (2007) also found support for 
strategic voting. In their strategic voting game (SVG1), participants faced 25 independent 
decision scenarios with four parties in a two-dimensional policy space. On average, half of the 
decisions were optimal, depending on the difficulty of the decision task and the availability 
(and quality) of pertinent information such as polls and coalition signals. This study further 
suggests that voters can rely on simple heuristics such as coalition signals and the distance, 
isolation, and strength of parties to optimize their vote. On average, these heuristic strategies 
make sense, but they are very risky and prone to failure without additional reliable 
confirmatory evidence such as polls. 
One key aspect, however, is missing. Strategic voting is essentially a coordination 
problem in which voters take into account the behavior of others to decide on an optimal 
course of action. This coordination requires information about the likely behavior of other 
voters. The most obvious source are polls that are widely available before national elections. 
The pundits in the media usually add comments and interpretations that should help even 
disinterested voters to draw some basic conclusions about the outcome of the upcoming 
election. What is easily overlooked, however, is the fact that most voters already have 
considerable experiential knowledge. As Lewis-Beck and Skalaban (1989) point out, voters as 
members of a polity usually have no difficulty to forecast the general outcome of an election. 
Forsythe and colleagues (1993) note that election histories, the results of previous elections 
including winners and/or incumbents, are among the various pieces of publicly available 
information that can facilitate strategic voting. Previous elections provide voters not only with 
information about the general strength of parties but also which coalition governments are 
likely to be formed after elections. In short, voters (can) learn from experience. Needless to 
say, the past is not always a perfect predictor of the future, but a reasonable starting point. 
Combined with poll information, the average voter should have sufficient information for 
strategic voting. As a consequence, the main purpose of this experiment is to investigate 
coordination and learning effects in repeated elections in more detail. 
 
Strategic vs. Optimal Voting 
The key assumption of the rational voter paradigm is that voters cast a strategic vote to 
maximize their expected utility by producing the optimal outcome. By definition, strategic 
decisions can involve all parties except the most preferred party. Because a sincere vote for 
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the most preferred party will often be the best decision, it is useful to classify all decisions—
sincere, insincere, or strategic—as optimal whenever they lead to the best possible outcome 
for the voter. Group decisions, however, make the evaluation of individual decisions rather 
complex. The basic idea is straightforward. The effect of individual vote decisions, whether 
they are optimal or not, cannot be evaluated in isolation. The whole electorate determines the 
election outcome, and depending on the behavior of the other voters, an individual vote 
decision might have very different consequences. In one case, a strategic vote might produce 
the optimal outcome for a given voter, but in another situation, the same vote might actually 
have negative consequences. In short, individual vote decisions can only be evaluated 
conditionally. 
The interdependency of individual (voter) and group (electorate) has additional 
consequences. For example, maximizing expected utility from individual and group 
perspective can be a compatible goal that requires complementary strategies. But it is also 
possible that these goals conflict with each other and require different and opposite strategies. 
An optimal outcome for the group overall will often require sacrifices from individual group 
members. Or in other words, individually optimal (egoistic) behavior might hurt the other 
voters.  
As a consequence, incompatible individual and group goals can produce a variety of 
stable outcomes when individually optimal decisions might be suboptimal for the whole 
group. From a game theoretic perspective, this would happen whenever individual decisions 
produce a Nash equilibrium. It can be optimal for the group overall as well, but more often it 
will settle at some suboptimal level. From the decision-theoretic perspective, the question is 
simply whether individual voters are able to maximize their expected utility given the 
behavior of the other voters in the electorate. But even under the best of circumstances—with 
full information about the distribution of party preferences and the rules of government 
formation—voting remains a decision under uncertainty. 
 
Voting as a Repeated Game 
The discussion above makes it clear that strategic voting is an extremely complex 
process that would appear to be outside the cognitive capacities of the average voter. The 
evidence suggests, however, that voters are frequently able to make optimal decisions under 
these circumstances. One way to explain this behavior is to point to the use of simple 
heuristics that simplify complex decision contexts by relying on simple shortcuts (Meffert and 
Gschwend 2007). More important, however, is the simple fact that most elections do not pose 
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a complete riddle to voters because they have participated before in elections. They know the 
parties and typical governments. They are familiar with the political system and can rely on 
their experiential knowledge to cast votes. Voting in elections is a repeated behavior, and 
voters “learn” over time what works and what not. Clearly, this knowledge is fundamental 
knowledge and will not be able to explain individual elections. A strategic voter will have to 
rely on short-term information such as polls and coalition signals by parties to supplement the 
long-term knowledge to cast successful strategic votes. Strategic voting is, figuratively and 
practically speaking, a repeated game in which participants (voters) can learn from experience 
and try to optimize their behavior. This conceptual idea can be translated quite literally into an 
experimental framework, an economic group experiment with repeated measures (vote 
decisions). 
 
Purpose of Study 
The goal of this study is to put the theory of strategic voting to an empirical test at the 
micro-level. By asking participants to make repeated decisions in different election scenarios, 
we can test (1) whether voters have the ability to make optimal decisions in complex 
multiparty systems and (2) how trade-offs between individual and group-level decisions and 
outcomes are resolved.  
 
Strategic Voting Game 2 
 
In order to test strategic voting in multiparty systems in an experimental study, the 
study design has to construct decision scenarios that capture several key characteristics of 
multiparty systems. More specifically, they have to include at least four parties, proportional 
representation with a minimum vote threshold, and coalition governments. These 
characteristics create a party system with multiple, non-trivial opportunities for coalition 
formation. To enable strategic voting, voters have to know their own party and/or policy 
preferences, the strength of the parties, and any coalition announcements or commitments by 
the parties. Finally, voters must know how governments are formed.  
With these requirements in mind, we developed a second Strategic Voting Game 
(SVG2) in which four parties compete for 11 voters in a series of repeated elections. The 
“electorate” encompasses seven potential swing voters, played by participants in the 
experiment, and four fixed or “habitual” voters, one for each party. Participants encountered 
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three election scenarios of varying levels of difficulty, each involving a series of five repeated 
elections. Government formation followed four sequential rules: 
1) Absolute Majority: A party with more than 50% of the seats wins. If no party 
obtains an absolute majority, the formation of a coalition government with an absolute 
majority is necessary. 
2) Coalition Signal: Parties that sent out a positive (pairwise) coalition signal have 
priority during government formation. Parties with a negative coalition signal can 
never form a coalition.  
3) Minimum Winning Coalition: If two or more coalitions have an absolute majority 
and the same coalition signal, the coalition with the lowest seat share wins. 
4) Random Sequence: If two or more coalitions have an absolute majority, the same 
coalition signal, and an identical seat share, the winning coalition is determined by a 
random party sequence (see below) that is generated before each election round. 
In case all four rules fail to produce a government, the election ends in a stalemate and no 
payoffs for the voters. If successful, the government determines the payoffs of the voters (as 
explained below).  
Because each party has a fixed “voter base” of one simulated voter, the remaining 
seven members of the electorate, and potential “swing voters,” are used to created the 
decision scenarios. The seven voters are assigned voter profiles that operationalize party 
preferences as numerical payoff points. The most preferred party is assigned 10 points, 
followed by 7, 3, and 0 points for second, third, and least preferred party. Due to an additional 
restriction, only eight different voter profiles are possible. As Figure 1 shows, the four parties 
A, B, C, and D are arranged as a rectangle, and the party diagonally opposite from the most 
preferred party is always the least preferred party. For example, a voter with B as first 
preference will always have C as the least preferred party while either A or D can be the 
second (and third) preference.  
Three scenarios were tested in the experiment. These scenarios were developed to 
create decision scenarios of varying difficulty. The first scenario, labeled “Germany” due to 
an accidental resemblance to an existing political system, presents two party blocks, each 
consisting of a large and a small party. In a sincere electorate, parties A and C will form a 
government because they have both a positive coalition signal and the required absolute 
majority. Supporters of parties B and D will have a larger incentive to consider strategic 
voting in order to obtain a better outcome. A government involving B and/or D is only 
possible if a supporter of A or C defects from these parties. For the electorate as a whole, an 
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absolute majority of C will produce the maximum payoff. Overall, this scenario provides a 
transparent decision scenario that suggests fairly straightforward decision strategies. 
However, because it is rather difficult to elect a different government, there are considerable 
obstacles to successful strategic voting. 
In the second scenario (“Sweden”), a single dominant party faces a fragile alliance of 
three small parties. In a sincere electorate, the party alliance wins but produces a suboptimal 
outcome that is undesirable for nearly all voters. In short, there are considerable pressures and 
opportunities for strategic voting. The optimal outcome for the electorate as the whole as well 
as six of the seven swing voters is an absolute majority of A. Only a single strategic voter is 
required to produce this outcome. But the election of A depends on coordination. The four 
supporters of party A have to stick with their preferred party (despite “losing” in the default 
outcome with a sincere electorate) and either the supporter of party B or party C has to vote 
for his or her second preference A. If voters understand this coordination problem, the optimal 
decision strategies should be fairly obvious. 
The third scenario (“Netherlands”) is by far the most difficult scenario. The parties are 
of similar strength and the coalition signals do not help to resolve government formation. In a 
sincere electorate, the only coalition with a positive signal does not have a majority, forcing 
the three parties with neutral signals to form a two-party coalition. Because all three parties 
are of similar strength, the minimum winning coalition rule does not help. Thus, the “random 
sequence” is required to determine which two-party coalition will emerge as the winner 
(given a sincere electorate). The random sequence is produced before each election and lists 
the four parties in a random order. In a tie of two or more coalitions with the same coalition 
signal and similar strength, the first party in this sequence that uniquely identifies one of the 
tied coalitions will determine the winning coalition. Given this high degree of uncertainty in 
this scenario, strategic voting can easily have decisive effects. However, determining the 
optimal strategy is extremely difficult. For the electorate as the whole, an absolute majority of 
C is optimal. 
Voters participate in a series of five repeated elections in each scenario. After each 
election round, individual payoffs are determined by the preference values of the parties in 
government. For single party governments, the payoff is equal to the individual preference 
value for that party. For coalitions, the payoff is the average of the preference values of the 
coalition parties, weighted by the number of votes obtained in the election. Thus, even if a 
voter cannot change a coalition government, he or she might still be able to influence the 
weight of the parties in that coalition, thereby maximizing the individual payoff. 
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Voters always know the coalition signals as well as the distribution of the first 
preferences of all voters in a given scenario. This information is presented as a party matrix 
and a “poll” and does not change during the five repeated elections in a given scenario. 
However, the amount of information available to voters varies. Under full information, 
participants also have knowledge of the random sequence as well as the distribution of second 
preferences of all voters. Under incomplete information, neither the random sequence nor the 
second preferences of the other voters are known. 
In order to prevent supergame effects and to insure approximately equal opportunities 
to earn payoff points, voter profiles were exchanged randomly before each election round. 
Thus, while voter profiles remained constant, each profile was assigned to a different 
participant before each election. 
 
Laboratory Experiment 
 
Participants 
Participants for the experiment were recruited by email from the participant pool of 
the experimental laboratory of the Collaborative Research Center (SFB 504) at the University 
of Mannheim, Germany. The average age of the 280 participants was 24 years, ranging from 
19 to 47 years, and 48.2% were male. Most participants were students enrolled in a variety of 
majors, most frequently in business, economics, and social sciences. 
 
Procedure 
At the beginning of each session, one or two groups with seven participants were 
seated at separate computer terminals and given a short verbal introduction, announcing that 
each participant would play with six other participants in a group game. Participants were told 
how payoff points would be converted in a cash payoff at the end. The study continued with a 
detailed explanation and instructions for the voting game on the computer screen. It 
concluded with a quiz of six-questions that tested and reinforced the knowledge and 
understanding of the rules of government formation (each question was followed by an 
explanation of the correct answers) (The full game instructions are documented in the 
Appendix). 
After all participants in a group had finished the quiz, a training session with one 
scenario and five repeated elections started. The training session was followed by the 
experimental session. Participants encountered the three scenarios discussed above in 
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randomized order, with five repeated elections each. In all sessions, participants had initially 
60 seconds to view a new election scenario (poll, coalition signals, and preference profile). 
The party matrix combined three pieces of information, coalition signals by the parties, the 
individual party preferences, and (optionally) the distribution of second preferences of all 
voters. The lines connecting the four parties were used to indicate the pairwise coalition 
signals. Thick black lines indicated a positive signal (priority during government formation), a 
thin dashed line a neutral signal (coalition possible), and two red separation marks instead of a 
connecting line indicated a negative signal (no coalition possible). In each party box, 
participants saw their current preference values. The most preferred party was additionally 
highlighted with a dark green background and the second preferred party with a light green 
background. 
In scenarios with full information, the random sequence to break potential ties during 
government formation was visible below the poll. In these cases, participants could also click 
on the party boxes in the preference and coalition signal matrix to make the distribution of 
second preferences visible (Figure 1 shows the three scenarios with incomplete and complete 
information).  
After the voting booth opened, participants had 60 seconds to cast their vote. A failure 
to vote in time was counted as abstention. After all group members had cast their vote, the 
result of the election (seats in parliament, government, decision rule, and individual payoff) 
were shown for 20 seconds (see Figure 2). Before subsequent election rounds in the same 
scenario, participants had 20 seconds to view and familiarize themselves with their newly 
assigned preference profiles before the voting booth opened again. On average, individual 
decisions required 6.0 seconds (SD=7.9, Median=3), and only 4 out of 5600 decisions were 
not made in time. At the group level, decisions took on average 17.7 seconds (SD=11.6, 
Median=15). 
Participants earned payoff points based on the government formed after each election. 
It was calculated as the weighted average of the preference values of the parties in 
government and ranged between 0 and 10 points. At the end of the study, the payoff points 
were converted into a cash payout in Euro (1 payoff point = 12 Cents).1 A minimum payoff of 
€4 was guaranteed for completing the voting game and answering a short questionnaire. The 
average payoff was €9.80 (about $15). 
                                                 
1 The conversion rate in one pilot session was slightly higher (.14). Given no evidence of 
deviating decision behavior, the pilot session data is combined with the other session data for 
the analyses.  
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After the last election, participants filled out a short questionnaire. It started with an 
open question about the decision strategy. After a few demographic questions, participants 
first responded to a short version of the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo and Petty 1982; 
agreement with 12 items about problem solving; α = .79), followed by an open-ended 13-item 
political knowledge scale (Zaller 1992), asking about the jobs of various public officials (and 
vice versa) and some questions about the political system (α = .80). Participants were thanked 
for their participation, debriefed, and collected their payoff upon leaving the lab. Participation 
took on average 61 minutes.  
 
Results 
 
Group-Level Results  
The analysis starts with an assessment of the voting behavior at the group level before 
focusing on individual decision making at the micro-level. A first indicator of the actual 
difficulty of the decision scenarios is the last rule used during government formation. Table 1 
indicates that single-party governments occurred in about a quarter of the elections in 
“Germany” (24.5%) and “Sweden” (30.0%), but not very often in the “Netherlands” (10.8%). 
The coalition signal clearly dominates government formation in “Germany” (72.0%) and 
“Sweden” (37.5%) but also affected a substantial number of elections in the “Netherlands” 
(37.8%). In “Germany,” only six elections ended with a minimum winning coalition, and one 
election ended in a stalemate. As expected, these election outcomes suggest a highly 
transparent scenario. In “Sweden,” the minimum winning coalition decided every fourth 
election (26.5%), and eleven elections required the random sequence to resolve ties (one 
election ended in a stalemate). This pattern of results suggests that government formation was 
somewhat more complicated. As expected, the “Netherlands” were the most difficult scenario. 
Two out of five elections were decided by a minimum winning coalition, and the random 
sequence was required in 11.4% of the elections. It should be noted that while the pattern of 
results clearly follows the intended differentiation by difficulty, the relatively rare application 
of the random sequence during government formation works against any information effect 
(manipulated visibility of the random sequence). Knowledge of the random sequence was 
intended to give participants an advantage in predicting the next government and help them to 
optimize their decision behavior. This is hardly possible if the random sequence is not or only 
rarely applied.  
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A key indicator of the success and failure of electoral behavior is the overall payoff 
obtained by the groups. Figure 2 shows the (density) distributions of group payoffs for the 
three scenarios. Vertical lines indicate the default or baseline payoff of a sincere electorate. In 
the “German” scenario, the groups did not systematically improve or worsen the baseline 
payoff. The mostly unimodal distribution of the group payoffs peaks around the default 
payoff. In “Sweden,” the groups overwhelmingly succeeded in improving the group payoffs 
over the low default payoff. However, the distribution is clearly bimodal with a large gap 
between those elections that resulted in the optimal single party government (A) and those 
that merely optimized the coalition government. In the third and most difficult scenario 
(“Netherlands”), the groups overwhelmingly worsened the default outcome, and the fairly flat 
unimodal distribution suggests no stable election outcomes. Overall, the three scenarios show 
the expected pattern of results.  
In order to investigate any differences due to full and incomplete information and to 
identify any learning effects across repeated elections, it is necessary to differentiate the 
payoffs by election round and information condition. Figure 4 summarizes the results for 
“Germany” in a bubble plot. The size of the bubbles indicates the relative frequency of the 
realized group payoffs. The solid horizontal line indicates the default group payoff of a 
sincere electorate while the dashed horizontal lines indicate possible Nash equilibria.2 The 
average group payoffs for elections with full and incomplete information are shown as 
squares and triangles, respectively. These averages fail to indicate both a learning effect and 
an information effect. The averages fluctuate slightly but mostly stay close to the default 
payoff. The results for “Sweden” (Figure 5) are very similar. In fact, the figure suggests a 
slight downward trend, with groups not only increasingly failing to obtain the optimal group 
payoff but also producing a few very bad outcomes. The “Netherlands” scenario (Figure 6) 
follows the other two by failing to show any information effect, even though the group 
payoffs show a very slight upward trend. In short, the group payoffs do not show the expected 
learning and information effects. 
Group payoffs, however, are not necessarily the best indicator of success and failure of 
individual decision strategies. A more appropriate indicator for this purpose is the number of 
voters in the electorate that made an optimal vote decision. An optimal vote decision is given 
                                                 
2 Due to the game design, any single-party government with an absolute majority plus one 
vote represents a Nash equilibrium. These equilibria also delimit the highest and lowest 
possible group payoff. Additional Nash equilibria are possible and are mostly associated with 
positive coalition signals. However, they do not always exist.  
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if a voter could not improve his or her payoff by casting a different ballot (while holding the 
vote decisions of the other voters constant). Figure 7 summarizes the results for all three 
scenarios. The “German” scenario has the highest share of optimal vote decisions, followed as 
expected by “Sweden” and the “Netherlands.” While the success rate in “Germany” does not 
show a clear trend, the averages for “Sweden” and the “Netherlands” show marginal 
improvements from first to last election round. These improvements, however, do not reach 
statistical significance.  
In summary, the group level results suggest that the scenarios were successful in 
creating decision scenarios of varying difficulty, but that the expected information and 
learning effects failed to materialize. 
 
Individual-Level Results  
Group-level results, however, allow only very limited inferences about voting 
behavior at the individual level. As a consequence, the following analyses focus on the latter. 
Table 2 provides a first impression by summarizing vote decisions by party preference for the 
three scenarios. It demonstrates that the assigned party preferences had the intended effect. 
Over half of all decisions (58.4%) were a sincere vote for the preferred party, including two 
thirds of vote decisions in “Germany.” About a third of all insincere decisions were in favor 
of the second preference. This decision is most notable in “Sweden” (37.9%) and reflects the 
relatively transparent strategic decisions to reach an optimal outcome, at least as implied by 
the default scenario. Third and fourth preferences as well as abstentions were infrequent 
choices. It should be noted that despite the strong trend towards sincere voting in the 
“German” scenario, the third preference was chosen most frequently (7.9%) among the three 
scenarios. We will return to this finding below.  
More informative than voting by preferences is the classification of vote decisions 
according to their success and failure. Table 3 differentiates the (insincere) strategic decisions 
according to winning, neutral, and losing outcomes (by comparing the realized payoffs with 
the hypothetical payoffs of a sincere vote for the first preference). Among all strategic 
decisions, “bad” decisions are most frequent (18.3%), followed by “winning” (14.6%) and 
inconsequential (8.7%) decisions. This pattern suggests that strategic voting has a mixed 
success rate, with the least mistakes in the most transparent “German” scenario (14.9%).  
The classification in sincere and strategic voting does not indicate whether these 
decisions were optimal (that is, obtained the highest possible payoff for an individual voter 
while holding the actual voting behavior of the other voters constant). While strategic votes 
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that produce a loss (compared to a sincere vote) can never be optimal, all other strategic and 
sincere decisions can be optimal. The second column for each scenario in Table 3 shows the 
share of optimal decisions for (or within) each category. These results suggest a different 
interpretation of success and failure of the decisions. Two-thirds of the sincere decisions in 
“Germany” and “Sweden” were optimal, and even strategic decisions without any effect on 
payoffs were optimal in 48.8% and 73.3% of the decisions, respectively. In short, the majority 
of decisions in these two scenarios were optimal (61.8% and 56.1%, respectively). As the 
most difficult and challenging scenario, the “Netherlands” also shows considerably lower 
success rates. Only 48.2% of the sincere votes and 67.6% of the strategic votes with wins (!) 
were optimal. Overall, only 43.2% of the decisions in this scenario were optimal. In short, 
successful strategic voting requires transparent decision scenarios. 
In a final step, we differentiate the optimal decisions further by distinguishing between 
the voter profiles in each scenario. By assigning specific voter roles and party preferences, 
each profile provides a unique opportunity structure for success and failure. Voters assigned 
to a dominant party are more likely to win high payoffs than voters assigned to a weaker or 
“loser” party with slim chances to succeed. Table 4 summarizes for each voter profile the 
share of optimal decisions, the average realized payoffs with standard deviations, and the 
most frequent party chosen when making strategic decisions.3 The table suggests that higher 
payoffs are associated with a higher share of optimal decisions, or in other words, that voters 
with preferences for “winning” parties are more likely to make optimal decisions. The notable 
exception to this pattern is the “isolated” voter with a preference for party D in “Sweden.” 
Despite the lowest average payoff, this voter (by sophisticated choice or inadvertently) has the 
highest rate of optimal decisions. 
As expected, the most frequent strategic choice is the second preference. Only the 
“German” scenario shows a deviation from this otherwise universal pattern. Voters with 
profile 4 (B-D), and arguably not much to lose, most frequently chose their third preference A 
when voting strategically. This suggests a clear understanding and implementation of strategic 
voting. This “voter” deserted the two most preferred parties (and potential coalition partners) 
in favor of the third preference. This decision is a strategic coalition vote that attempts to 
move the (disliked) coalition government at least somewhat in a more favorable direction. In 
addition, voters with profile 5 (C-A) represent the only voter profile or type that, realizing the 
                                                 
3 Because each scenario has only seven swing voters, not all (eight) possible voter profiles can 
exist in each scenario. In addition, a specific voter profile can be assigned to more than one 
participant. 
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privileged position, never deserted the preferred party. As a consequence, this profile obtained 
on average the highest payoff in this or all other scenarios. In short, the decisions by the 
voters with these two profiles suggest a sophisticated understanding of the decision task. 
A more systematic test of learning and information effects at the individual level 
requires a multivariate model that includes not only the election round but also the order in 
which the scenario appeared in the experimental session, as well as other individual- and 
group-level variables such as decision times and political knowledge. Initial tests with 
individual payoffs and optimal decisions as dependent variables do not show significant 
effects beyond the voter profiles (tables not reported). The only consistently significant 
variable is the overall group payoff. It is negatively related to individual payoffs and optimal 
decisions in “Germany” and the “Netherlands,” suggesting a zero-sum game in which group 
and individual goals create a conflict. The group payoff in “Sweden,” on the other hand, is 
positively associated with individual payoffs and optimal decisions, suggesting 
complementary group and voter interests. 
In addition, the correct specification of these decision models is unclear. While 
repeated decisions and two levels suggest a repeated measures multi-level model, the fact that 
group- and individual-level variables are reciprocally affect each other raises doubts on the 
correct specification. For these two reasons, no multivariate models of individual decision 
making are reported at this point. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this experimental study of strategic voting in multiparty systems 
with coalition governments was a test of learning and information effects in repeated 
elections, using a group experimental design. The study design succeeded in creating decision 
scenarios of varying degrees of difficulty. Success and failure of voting decisions both at the 
group and individual level reflect these design characteristics. In terms of the main purpose, 
however, the study failed to confirm either a learning effect over time or an information 
effect. The latter failure might be due to the fact that the manipulated information, the random 
sequence used to break ties during government formation, was not able to provide the 
expected advantage. The random sequence did not come into play at all or at best was used in 
every tenth election.  
The absence of learning effects is more difficult to explain. A possible explanation is 
the difficulty of the decision task. Identifying the optimal decision strategy in two of the three 
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scenarios was fairly easy as long as the other voters behave sincerely. But once several voters 
start to pursue strategic decisions, identifying optimal decisions becomes very difficult. In 
addition, if a single group member fails to understand the rules and makes “unexpected” 
decisions, it will be very difficult for the other group members to optimize their decisions or 
pursue a sophisticated decision strategy. With only five repeated elections and constantly 
changing voter profiles, participants might have lacked the opportunity to develop or “learn” 
reliable and consistent strategies to optimize their vote decisions.  
At the same time, the overall results suggest that participants were fairly successful. 
Over half of the decisions were optimal, that is, the best possible decision, while at most 
every fifth decision was “wrong.” While the number of bad decisions did not increase in the 
most difficult scenario, it is clearly the case that successful decision strategies with optimal 
outcomes require transparent election scenarios that allow voters to forecast the outcome of 
the next election. When given the chance, most voters seize the opportunity.  
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Figure 1: Election Scenarios 
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Figure 2: Screenshot of Game Screen (Display of Election Results) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Group Payoffs 
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Note: Lines represent density distribution of group payoffs for each scenario, vertical lines represent the default 
group payoff of a sincere electorate. N=200 (N=185.for “Netherlands”). 
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Figure 4: Group Payoffs „Germany“ 
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Note: Solid horizontal line represents group payoff of sincere electorate, dashed horizontal lines represent Nash 
equilibria (including highest and lowest possible group payoff). The size of the circles represents the relative 
frequency of the respective group payoff. N=40. 
 
Figure 5: Group Payoffs „Sweden“ 
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Note: Solid horizontal line represents group payoff of sincere electorate, dashed horizontal lines represent Nash 
equilibria (including highest and lowest possible group payoff). The size of the circles represents the relative 
frequency of the respective group payoff. N=40. 
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Figure 6: Group Payoffs „Netherlands“ 
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Note: Solid horizontal line represents group payoff of sincere electorate, dashed horizontal lines represent Nash 
equilibria (including highest and lowest possible group payoff). The size of the circles represents the relative 
frequency of the respective group payoff. N=37. 
 
Figure 7: Number of Optimal Payoffs 
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Note: Bars represent the average number of voters in a given election round who cast a vote that resulted in the 
optimal (highest possible) payoff (given the actual vote decisions of the other voters). Spikes represent the 95% 
confidence interval around the means. Each bar summarizes 40 group decisions (37 for “The Netherlands”) with 
7 voters. 
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Table 1: Last Rule Applied During Government Formation 
 
Last Rule “Germany“ “Sweden“ “Netherlands“
    
(1) Absolute Majority 24.5% 30.0% 10.8% 
(2) Coalition Signal 72.0% 37.5% 37.8% 
(3) Minimal Winning Coalition 3.0% 26.5% 40.0% 
(4) Random Sequence 0.0% 5.5% 11.4% 
Stalemate 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 
    
Elections (N) 200 200 185 
    
 
 
Table 2: Vote Decision By Preference 
 
Vote Decision “Germany“ “Sweden“ “Netherlands“ Total 
     
1st Preference 66.9% 56.3% 56.8% 58.4% 
2nd Preference 21.7% 37.9% 33.3% 32.1% 
3rd Preference 7.9% 2.8% 6.8% 5.8% 
4th Preference 3.2% 2.4% 2.9% 3.2% 
Abstention 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.5% 
     
 
 
Table 3: Success and Failure 
 
Vote Decisions “Germany“ “Sweden“ “Netherlands“ Gesamt 
    % 
Optimal 
Share    % 
Optimal 
Share    % 
Optimal 
Share    % 
Optimal 
Share
    
Sincere Vote 66.9 70.1% 56.3 65.9% 56.8 48.2% 58.4 65.1%
Strategic Vote    
 with Win 12.3 97.7% 13.6 87.4% 20.2 67.6% 14.6 80.1%
 w/out Effect 5.9 48.8% 9.6 73.3% 3.9 54.9% 8.7 68.5%
 with Loss 14.9 20.4 19.1  18.3 
    
N 1400 61.8% 1400 56.1% 1295 43.2% 5495 55.7%
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Table 4: Optimal Vote Decisions by Preference Profile 
 
 “Germany“ “Sweden“ “Netherlands“ 
Profile Opt. Payoff SW Opt. Payoff SW Opt. Payoff SW 
 (%) (M) (SD) (P) (%) (M) (SD) (P) (%) (M) (SD) (P) 
           
1 (A-B) 60.5 4.8 (1.4) B 53.5 6.1 (3.0) B 37.3 4.2 (1.8) B 
2 (A-C)     56.5 6.1 (2.9) C 34.6 5.6 (1.6) C 
3 (B-A) 41.0 2.3 (1.9) A 49.5 5.4 (2.1) A 36.2 3.2 (1.8) A 
4 (B-D) 39.5 1.5 (2.2) A         
5 (C-A) 78.5 8.5 (2.3) --- 57.5 5.5 (2.1) A 49.2 6.7 (1.6) A 
6 (C-D) 78.0 7.6 (2.0) D     56.2 6.8 (1.8) D 
7 (D-B)     65.5 3.8 (2.9) B 41.6 4.4 (1.6) B 
8 (D-C) 57.0 5.2 (1.4) C     47.0 5.8 (1.8) C 
           
Note: Opt. = Percentage (%) of optimal decisions 
Payoff = Average realized payoff (M) and standard deviation (SD) 
SW = Most frequently chosen party (P) in case of a strategic vote. 
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Appendix: Game Instructions 
 
[Announced by experimenter:] 
 
Welcome to the experiment “Voting Game.” We investigate decision making in a series of repeated 
elections. Six participants play together in one group. The study is conducted at the computer and will 
take approximately one hour. The game will be explained in detail at the beginning. You should read 
the instructions carefully. The introduction ends with a short test of the rules. Please try to finish the 
introduction and the test in about 15 to 20 minutes. The training game can only start when all 
participants have finished the test. Please let me know if you have any questions or encounter any 
problems with the computer. 
Please turn of or mute your mobile phone to avoid any interruptions during the session. 
During the game, you will win payoff points that will be converted into Euro at the end. In this 
session, one payoff point corresponds to 12 Cent. To receive the payoff at the end, you have to 
complete all games and answer a questionnaire at the end. Then a payoff of 4 Euro is guaranteed. 
Are there any questions?  
You can start by pressing the function key [F8]. 
 
[The following instructions are shown on the computer screen.] 
 
Welcome to the "Voting Game" 
Thank you for participating in this study about voting behavior. The study investigates decision 
making in a series of elections. The “government” formed after each election determines your win. 
The amount you win depends on your own decisions, the decisions of other participants, and the 
constantly changing assignment of party preferences. Participation will take about 50 to 60 minutes. 
Press "Start" when you are ready to begin. 
 
Important Reminder 
It is very important that you are not distracted from the tasks in this study. For that reason, please turn 
off your communication devices (mobile phone, pager, etc.) for the duration of this study. Your 
cooperation is appreciated. 
 
Procedure of Study 
The study has three parts. In the first part, the voting game will be introduced with a detailed 
explanation of the rules of the game. The introduction ends with a short test of the rules.  
In the second part, the actual game takes place. The first game with 5 elections will be for training 
purposes only and will not affect your final payoff. In the following 3 games, with 5 elections each, 
your decisions will determine how much you will win.  
In the final part, you will be asked to fill out a final questionnaire. 
 
Introduction to Voting Game 
Please read the following information very carefully because successful participation requires a very 
good understanding of the rules. 
In this voting game, 4 parties compete for the votes of 11 voters. Each party has a “voter base” of one 
voter who will always vote for the same party (simulated by the computer). The other seven voters 
will be played by participants in the study.  
Every game consists of an election scenario with a known distribution of the party preference of the 
voters as well as coalition announcements by the parties. Both do not change over several elections. 
Each game consists of 5 repeated elections. Before every election, each participant is assigned 
randomly to play one of the seven voters. 
 
Voting Procedure and Information 
Parties that obtain at least 15% of the cast votes will have seats in the new “parliament.” The winner of 
an election is either a single party or a two- or three-party coalition with an absolute majority of seats 
(at least 51%). 
At the beginning of each election, the following information is always known: 
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- A “poll” with the distribution of the party preference of all voters; 
- Coalition announcements by the parties; 
- The rules of government formation.  
 
Rules of Government Formation (1/2) 
Four rules determine the formation of government. These rules are crucial for the game and are 
applied sequentially in the following order: 
1) “Absolute Majority:” The party with at least 51% of the seats wins. If no party has an absolute 
majority on its own, a coalition government with an absolute majority will be formed. 
2) “Coalition Announcement:” Positive coalition announcements have priority during government 
formation, and negative coalition announcements rule out this coalition. 
 
Rules of Government Formation (2/2) 
3) “Minimal Winning Coalition:” If two coalitions have an absolute majority but also made the same 
(positive or neutral) coalition announcement, the following rules apply: 
a) A two-party-coalition beats a three-party-coalition. 
b) With the same number of parties, the coalition with the lower seat share (of at least 51%) 
wins. 
4) “Random Sequence:” Remaining stalemates between coalitions will be broken by a random 
sequence that is generated before each election (but which is not always known). 
If two parties have 50% of the seats each, government formation is not possible and you will receive 
no payoff (the next election follows). 
 
Payoff, Time Limit, and Game Screen 
Payoff points determine your party preferences. Your most preferred party has 10 points, followed by 
7, 3, and 0 points for the other three parties. In case of a single party government, your win will be the 
corresponding payoff points. In case of a coalition government, your win will be the average payoff 
points of the member parties, weighted (!) by the number of votes for each party. 
The time to make a vote decision is limited to 60 seconds. If you fail to cast a ballot during this time, it 
will be automatically counted as abstention.  
Next, you will be introduced to the game screen. A blue box will provide you with explanations of the 
various parts of the game screen.  
 
[The following instructions are shown as part of the game screen.] 
Voting Game – Introduction 
The poll on the left shows you the distribution of the first preferences of all voters for parties A to D 
(both as count and percentage). 
To the right, you see the party matrix with your personal, current payoff points. 
Your most preferred party is highlighted in a dark green color, and your second preference is shown in 
a light green (here C and D). 
The most and least preferred party are diagonally opposite for all voters (here B). The second 
preference of supporters of a party can be different (here A would be possible, too). 
The lines and red crossbars between the parties indicate (pairwise) coalition announcements. A thick 
solid line indicates a positive coalition signal (priority during government formation), a dashed line 
indicates the absence of a coalition announcement (but a coalition is possible), and two red crossbars 
instead of a line indicates a negative coalition signal (no coalition possible). 
In a game with complete information you will see below the poll a random sequence that is used to 
break remaining ties during the formation of coalitions. If rules 1 – 3 fail to determine a government, 
the coalition with the first party in the sequence that is unique to one of the coalitions in the tie wins 
(rule 4). 
When the random sequence is visible, you can also find out the distribution of the second preferences 
of the voters. If you click on the box of a party, you will see not only the total number of the party 
supporters (in a circle) but also the second preferences (minus one voter representing the fixed voter 
base of the party). Clicking a second time on a box hides the information again. Try it out for different 
parties. 
[Example shown:] 
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2 = Total number of voters with C as first preference, including the constant voter in the “voter 
base” (identical to poll) 
1 = One potential swing voter with first preference C has D as second preference. 
0 = No potential swing voter with first preference C has A as second preference. 
The voting booth is on the right. When a new game starts, you have initially 60 seconds to orient 
yourself. Then the election starts and the voting booth will be open for at most 60 seconds and closes 
once you voted. 
Next, vote counting starts. You may have to wait until all voters have cast their votes. 
The current status of the game will always be announced in the text box below the voting booth. 
After the ballot is completed, the election result will be announced in the table on the bottom of the 
screen. It shows the number of voters (and non-voters), the vote shares of the parties as a percentage of 
the cast ballots, and the seat shares of the parties represented in parliament. 
In this election, a supporter of B appears to have voted for party A. With only one voter, party B fails 
to pass the 15% threshold. 
Below the result you see the new government (here A-D). The last rule that was used to form the 
government is listed in the status window above. 
The logic of government formation in this case: 
Party A fails to obtain an absolute majority (according to rule 1); 
According to rule 2 (coalition signal), B-D has a positive signal and priority, but B has no seats in 
parliament; A-C is ruled out by a negative coalition signal (even if it would be a minimal winning 
coalition otherwise);  
With a neutral signal, A-D is the only possible two-party coalition (C-D fails to obtain an absolute 
majority). 
The government always determines your payoff (even if you abstain or vote for a different party). 
Here it is the weighted average of your preferences for A (= 3) and D (= 7), divided by their respective 
number of votes (5 and 3). Because A is stronger, the payoff must be closer to the value of A. It is 
exactly 4.5 points, or: 
  A (3 * 5) + D (7 * 3) 
----------------------------  = 4.5 
     Voters (5 + 3) 
 
During the game, your current tally of cumulative payoff points is shown in parentheses after the 
election payoff (during the training game, you will only see the payoff in each election in parentheses). 
The result of an election will be shown for 20 seconds. Then the next election starts. All participants 
switch their voter identities and your new party preferences are shown in the party matrix above. You 
have 20 seconds to orient yourself before the voting booth opens. After 5 elections, a new game 
begins. 
The introduction is finished. If you have questions or something is not clear, please contact the 
experimenter now. 
Next you will take a short (but hard) test of the rules to optimize you decision making skills. 
 
[Participants answer six multiple choice questions. Each answer is followed by an explanation of the 
correct answer.] 
 
[Announced by experimenter when all participants have finished the test:] 
 
Are there any questions? Now the training game will start. It consists of one scenario with five 
repeated elections. The payoff points you win here are not counted toward your payoff at the end. 
 
[Announced by experimenter when participants have finished the training game:] 
 
Are there any questions? Now three games, each with five repeated elections, will follow. The payoff 
points you win now determine your payoff at the end. 
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